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In this paper, we present a unied framework to analyze rationalizable
strategic behavior in any arbitrary games by using Harsanyis notion of type.
(i) We investigate properties of rationalizability in general games. Specically,
we show that the set of all the rationalizable strategy proles is the largest
rationalizable set in product form. Moreover, we show that the largest ratio-
nalizable set can be derived by the (possibly transnite) iterated elimination of
never-best responses (IENBR). In particular, IENBR is a well-dened order-
independent procedure. (ii) We investigate the relationship between rational-
izability and Nash equilibrium in general games. We provide a su¢ cient and
necessary condition to guarantee no spurious Nash equilibria in the reduced
game after the IENBR procedure. (iii) We formulate and prove that ratio-
nalizability is the strategic implication of common knowledge of rationality in
general games.
Keywords: Type space; Monotonicity; Rationalizability; Iterated elimination;
Nash equilibrium; Common knowledge; Rationality
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The notion of rationalizability was introduced independently by Bernheim
(1984) and Pearce (1984) and thus far has become one of the most important
solution concepts in non-cooperative games. The basic idea behind this notion
is that rational behavior must be justied by rational beliefsand conversely,
rational beliefsmust be based on rational behavior. The notion of ratio-
nalizability captures the strategic implications of the assumption of common
knowledge of rationality(see Tan and Werlang (1988)), which is very di¤er-
ent from the assumption of commonality of beliefsor correct conjectures
behind an equilibrium (see Aumann and Brandenburger (1995)).
In the literature, the study of rationalizable strategic behavior is restricted
to nite games with continuous payo¤functions. Since many important models
arising in economic applications are games with innite strategy spaces and
discontinuous payo¤ functions, e.g., models of price and spatial competition,
auctions, and mechanism design, it is clearly important and practically relevant
to extend the notion of rationalizability to very general situations with various
modes of behavior. Epstein (1997) provided a unied model of preferenceto
allow for di¤erent categories of preferences such as subjective expected utility,
probabilistically sophisticated preference, Choquet expected utility and the
multi-priors model, and presented the notion of P-rationalizability. However,
from a technical point of view, Epsteins (1997) analysis relies on topological
assumptions on the game structure and, in particular, most of his discussion
on rationalizability is restricted to nite games. Apt (2007) relaxed the nite
set-up of games and studied rationalizability by an iterative procedure, but
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Apts (2007) analysis requires playerspreferences to have a form of expected
utility. In this paper we study rationalizable strategic behavior in arbitrary
games with general preferences.
We o¤er a denition of rationalizability in general situations (Denition
1). Roughly speaking, a set of strategy proles is regarded as rationalizable
if every strategy in this set is justied by a type from the set. We show
that rationalizable strategies can be derived from an iterated elimination of
never-best responses (IENBR) (Theorem 1).
To dene the notion of rationalizability, we need to consider a system
of preferences/beliefs in every subgame. Following Epsteins (1997) notion
of model of preference, by using Harsanyis (1967-68) notion of type, we
introduce the model of type,which species a set of admissible and feasible
types for each of players in every contingencies. For each type of a player,
the player is able to make a decision over his own strategies. Our approach is
topology-free and is applicable to any arbitrary games.
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between rationalizability and
Nash equilibrium and present a necessary and su¢ cient condition for no spu-
rious Nash equilibria (Theorem 2). This paper is thereby closely related to
Chen et al.s (2007) work on strict dominance in general games. In this paper,
we also study the epistemic foundation of rationalizability in general games;
in particular, we formulate and prove that rationalizability is the strategic
implication of common knowledge of rationality in general settings (Theorem
3).
The rest of this paper is organized into ve sections. Section 2 is the set-
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up. Sections 3 and 4 present the main results concerning rationalizability with
IENBR and Nash equilibrium respectively. Section 5 provides the epistemic
foundation for rationalizability. Section 6 o¤ers some concluding remarks.
2. Set-up
Consider a normal-form game
G  (N; fSigi2N ; fuigi2N);
where N is an (in)nite set of players, Si is an (in)nite set of player is
strategies, and ui : S ! R is player is arbitrary payo¤ function where S 
i2NSi. For s 2 S let s  (si; s i). A strategy prole s is a (pure) Nash







 8si 2 Si.
The notion of typeby Harsanyi (1967-68) is a simple and parsimonious
description of the exhaustive uncertainty facing a player, including the players
knowledge, preferences/beliefs, etc. Given one player is type, he has one
corresponding preference over his own strategies, according to which he can
make his decision. We consider a model of type (on G):1
T ()  fTi()gi2N ;
1This is in the same spirit of Epsteins (1997) model of preference; see also Chen and
Luo (2010).
3
where Ti() is dened for every (nonempty) subset S 0  S and every player
i 2 N . The set Ti(S 0) is interpreted as player is type space in the reduced game
GjS0  (N; fS 0igi2N ; fuijS0gi2N), where uijS0 is the payo¤ function ui restricted
on S 0. Each type ti 2 Ti(S 0) has a corresponding preference relation %ti over
player is strategies in Si. The indi¤erence relation, ti, is dened as usual,
i.e., si ti s0i i¤ si %ti s0i and s0i %ti si. For instance, we may consider Ti(S 0) as
a probability space or a regular preference space dened on S 0. The following
example demonstrates that the analytical framework can be applied to nite
games where the players have the standard subjective expected utility (SEU)
preferences.
Example 1. Consider a nite game G. Player is belief about the strategies
his opponents play in the reduced game GjS0 is dened as a probability distri-
bution i over S
0








is the set of probability
distributions over S 0 i. For any i, the expected payo¤ of si can be calculated
by Ui (si; i) =
P
s i2S0 i ui (si; s i)  i (s i) where i (s i) is the probability
assigned by i to s i. That is, i generates an SEU preference over Si. For
our purpose we may dene a model of type (on G) as follows:
T ()  fTi()gi2N ;




for every (nonempty) subset
S 0  S.
Throughout this paper, we impose the following two conditions, C1 and
C2, for the model of type.
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C1 (Monotonicity) 8i, Ti(S 0)  Ti(S 00) if S 0  S 00.
The monotonicity condition states that when one player faces greater strate-
gic uncertainty, the player possesses more types to be used for resolving un-
certainty. Under C1, Ti  Ti (S) can be viewed as the universaltype space
of player i.
For s 2 S, player is Dirac type i (s) is a type with the property:
8s0i; s00i 2 Si; ui(s0i; s i)  ui(s00i ; s i) i¤ s0i %i(s) s00i :
A Dirac type i (s) is a degenerated type with which player i behaves as if he
faces a certain play s i of his opponents. The following condition states that
the type space on a singleton contains only a Dirac type. This condition seems
to be a rather natural requirement when strategic uncertainty is reduced to
the case of certainty.
C2 (Diracability) 8i, Ti(fsg) = fi (s)g if s 2 S.
In nite games, it is easy to see that C1 and C2 are satised for the standard
SEU preference model dened in Example 1. Note that C1 and C2 imply that
8i, i (s) 2 Ti(S 0) if s 2 S 0, i.e., the type space on S 0 contains all the possible
Dirac types on S 0.
A strategy si 2 Si is a best response to ti 2 Ti(S 0) if si %ti s0i for any
s0i 2 Si. Notice that even if a reduced game GjS0 is concerned, any strategy
of player i in the original game G can be a candidate for the best response.
Let BR (ti) denote the set of best responses to ti. The following lemma states
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that Nash equilibrium can be dened by the Dirac type.
Lemma 1. s is a Nash equilibrium i¤, for every player i, si is a best response
to i (s).






8si 2 Si i¤, for every player i, si %i(s) si 8si 2 Si i¤, for every player i, si is
a best response to i (s). 
Next we provide the formal denition of rationalizability in general games.
The spirit of this denition is that for every strategy in a rationalizable set,
the player can always nd some type in the type space dened over this set to
support his choice of strategy.
Denition 1. A subset R  S is rationalizable if 8i and 8s 2 R, there exists
some ti 2 Ti(R) such that si 2 BR(ti).
The following lemma asserts that there is the largest rationalizable set.
Lemma 2. Let R  [R is rationalizableR. Then R is the largest rationalizable
set.
Proof: It su¢ ces to show that R is a rationalizable set. Let s 2 R. Then,
there exists a rationalizable set R such that s 2 R. Thus, for every player i,
there exists some ti 2 Ti(R) such that si 2 BR(ti). Since R  R, by C1,
ti 2 Ti(R): 
Although Cartesian-product form is not imposed on rationalizable sets, the
following lemma shows that the largest rationalizable set must be in this form.
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Lemma 3. If R is rationalizable, then i2NRi is rationalizable, where Ri 
fsij s 2 Rg. Hence, R = i2N ([R is rationalizableRi).
Proof: Let s 2 i2NRi. Then, for every player i, there exists ti 2 Ti(R) such
that si 2 BR(ti). Since R  i2NRi, by C1, ti 2 Ti(i2NRi).
SinceRi = [R is rationalizableRi for all i, by Lemma 2,i2N ([R is rationalizableRi)
is rationalizable and, hence, R = i2N ([R is rationalizableRi). 
3. IENBR and rationalizability
In the literature, rationalizability is also dened as the outcome of an iter-
ated elimination of never-best responses. We dene a transnite elimination
process that can be used for any arbitrary game.2 Let 0 denote the rst
element in an ordinal , and let  + 1 denote the successor to  in . For
any S 0 and S 00 with S 00  S 0  S, S 0 is said to be reduced to S 00 (notation:
S 0 ! S 00) if, 8s 2 S 0nS 00, there exists some player i such that si =2 BR (ti) for
any ti 2 Ti (S 0).
Denition 2. An iterated elimination of never-best responses (IENBR) is
a nite, countably innite, or uncountably innite family fRg2 such that
R
0
= S, R ! R+1, (and R = \0<R0 for a limit ordinal ), and R1 
\2R ! R0 only for R0 = R1.
A central result of this paper is provided below, which tells that Denitions
1 and 2 are equivalent.
2See Chen et al.s (2007) Example 1 for the reason why we need a transnite process in
general games.
7
Theorem 1. R1 = R.
Proof. (i) By Denition 2, 8s 2 R1, every player i has some ti 2 Ti(R1)
such that si 2 BR(ti). So R1 is a rationalizable set and, hence, R1  R.
(ii) By Lemma 2, R is a rationalizable set and, by C1, survives every
round of elimination in Denition 2. So R  R1. 
The denition of IENBR procedure does not require the elimination of all
never-best response strategies in each round of elimination. This exibility
raises a question whether any IENBR procedure results a unique outcome.
Theorem 1 implies that IENBR is a well-dened order-independent procedure.
Corollary 1. R1 exists and is unique. Moreover, R1 is nonempty if G has
a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. R exists and is unique and, by Theorem 1, R1 exists and is unique
for any game.
Let s be a Nash equilibrium in G. Since si is a best response to i (s
) for
every player i, by C2, fsg is a rationalizable set. By Theorem 1, s 2 R1. 
4. Nash equilibrium and rationalizability
Corollary 1 shows that every Nash equilibrium survives IENBR and hence
every Nash equilibrium is a rationalizable strategy prole. However, the fol-
lowing example taken from Chen et al. (2007) demonstrates that a Nash
equilibrium in the reduced game after an IENBR procedure may be a spurious
Nash equilibrium, i.e., it is not a Nash equilibrium in the original game.
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Example 2. Consider a two-person symmetric game: G   N; fSigi2N ; fuigi2N,
where N = f1; 2g, S1 = S2 = [0; 1], and for all xi; xj 2 [0; 1], i; j = 1; 2, and
i 6= j (cf. Fig. 1)
ui(xi; xj) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1, if xi 2 [1=2; 1] and xj 2 [1=2; 1],
















Figure 1. Payo¤ function ui (xi; xj).
It is easily veried that R1 = [1=2; 1]  [1=2; 1] since every strategy si 2
[0; 1=2) is strictly dominated and hence never a best response. That is, IENBR
leaves the reduced game GjR1 
 




further reduced. Clearly, R1 is the set of Nash equilibria in the reduced game
GjR1. However, it is easy to see that the set of Nash equilibria in game
G is fs 2 R1j s1; s2 =2 (2=3; 5=6)g. Thus, IENBR generates spurious Nash
equilibria s 2 R1 where some si 2 (2=3; 5=6).
For any subset S 0  S, we say that G  (N; fSigi2N ; fuigi2N) has well-
dened best responses on S 0 if 8i and 8s 2 S 0, BR (i (s)) 6= ?. Let NE denote
the set of Nash equilibria in G, and NEjR1 the set of Nash equilibria in the
reduced game GjR1  (N; fR1i gi2N ; fuijR1gi2N). A su¢ cient and necessary
condition under which rationalizability generates no spurious Nash equilibria
is provided below.
Theorem 2. NE = NEjR1 i¤ G has well-dened best responses on NEjR1.
Proof. (Only if part.) Let s 2 NEjR1. Since NEjR1 = NE, si 2
BR (i (s
)) 8i. Thus, BR (i (s)) 6= ? for all i.
(If part.) (i) Let s 2 NE. By Corollary 1, s 2 R1 and, hence,
s 2 NEjR1. SoNE  NEjR1 : (ii) Let s 2 NEjR1 . SinceG has well-dened
best responses on NEjR1 , for every player i there exists some s^i 2 Si such that
s^i 2 BR (i(s)), which implies that s^i %i(s) si and (s^i; s i) 2 R1. Since
s 2 NEjR1, si %i(s) s^i. Therefore, si i(s) s^i and, hence, si 2 BR (i(s)).
That is, s 2 NE. So NEjR1  NE. 
In Example 2, it is easy to verify that (i)G has no well-dened best response
on the set of spurious Nash equilibria i.e. fs 2 R1j s1 2 (2=3; 5=6) or s2 2 (2=3; 5=6)g
and (ii) G has well-dened best responses on the set of non spurious Nash
equilibria  i.e. fs 2 R1j s1; s2 =2 (2=3; 5=6)g. This su¢ cient and necessary
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condition in Theorem 2 does not involve any topological assumption on the
original or the reduced games. In Chen et al.s (2007) Corollary 4, some
classes of games with special topological structures were proved to preserve
Nash equilibriafor the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
These results are also applicable to the IENBR procedure.
The following corollary asserts that if one game is solvable by the IENBR
procedure, the unique rationalizable strategy prole is the only Nash equilib-
rium.
Corollary 2. NE = R1 if jR1j = 1.
Proof. Let R1 = fsg. By C2, si is a best response to i (s) for every player
i. So s 2 NE and hence R1  NE. By Corollary 1, NE  R1. 
5. Epistemic foundation
In this section we provide epistemic conditions for rationalizability in gen-
eral games. A model of knowledge for a game G is given by
M (G)  (
; fsigi2N ; ftigi2N) ;
where 
 is the space of states with typical element ! 2 
, si (!) 2 Si is player
is strategy at state !, and ti (!) 2 Ti is player is type at state !.
A subset E  
 is referred to as an event. Denote by s (!) the strategy
prole at ! and let
SE  fs (!) j ! 2 Eg.
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We extend the model of type in Section 2 to the space of states as follows.
Consider a model of type on 
:
eT ()  feTi()gi2N ;
where eTi() is dened over every (nonempty) subset E  
. The set eTi(E) is
referred to as player is type space for event E, and each type ti 2 eTi(E) has a
preference relation %ti on player is strategies in Si. For our purpose, we need
the following conditions for the model of type on 
.





, \1l=1 eTi  El  eTi  \1l=1El
8i.
C4 (Consistency) For any event E  
, eTi(E) = Ti(SE) 8i.
The continuity condition C3 requires that the intersection of type spaces
on a sequence of events is included in the type space on the intersection of
the sequence of events. This kind of condition is related to the property of
knowledge structure termed limit closure in Fagin et al. (1999), which is
satised by most of type models discussed in the literature, e.g., (countably
additive) probability measure spaces and regular preference models. The con-
sistency condition C4 requires that the type space on an event is consistent
with the type space on the strategies projected from the event. This condition
is much in the same spirit of marginal consistency imposed on preference
models (see Epstein (1997)).
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Say player i knows an event E at !if ti (!) 2 eTi (E). Let
KiE  f! 2 
j i knows E at !g.
For simplicity, we assume the knowledge operator satises the axiom of knowl-
edge, i.e., KiE  E. An event E is called a self-evident event in E, if
K E = E  E. Dene the event E is mutual knowledgeas:
KE  \i2NKiE;
and the event E is common knowledgeas:
CKE  \1l=1K lE




for l  2. The following lemma
shows that some useful properties about the knowledge operator K and the
common knowledge operator CK. It is easy to see that these properties are
satised by the standard semantic model of knowledge with partitional infor-
mation structures (see, e.g., Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Chapter 5)).
Lemma 4. The operators K and CK satisfy the following properties:
1. E  F ) KE  KF .
2. \1l=1KEl = K
 \1l=1El.
3. ! 2 CKE i¤ ! 2 E for some self-evident E  E.
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Proof. (1) Let ! 2 KE. Then ti (!) 2 eTi (E) 8i. If E  F , by C1 and C4,eTi (E)  eTi (F ). Hence ti (!) 2 eTi (F ) 8i, i.e., ! 2 KF .
(2) By Lemma 4.1, it su¢ ces to show \1l=1KEl  K
 \1l=1El. Let ! 2
\1l=1KEl. Then ! 2 KEl for all l  1 i¤, for all i, ti (!) 2 eTi  El for all l  1
i¤, for all i, ti (!) 2 \1l=1 eTi  El. By C3, ti (!) 2 eTi  \1l=1El for all i, i.e.,
! 2 K  \1l=1El.
(3) (Only if part.) Let ! 2 CKE. By KE  E and Lemma 4.1,
K l+1E  K lE for all l  1. By Lemma 4.2, K (CKE) = K  \1l=1K lE =
\1l=2K lE = CKE. Let E = CKE. Then E is self-evident and ! 2 E .
(Ifpart.) Let ! 2 E = K E  E. By Lemma 4.1, K l+1 E = K l E 
K lE for all l  1. So ! 2 E  \1l=1K lE = CKE. 
Say player i is rational at !if si (!) is a best response to ti (!). Let
Ri  f! 2 
j i is rational at !g
and
R  \i2NRi.
That is, R is the event everyone is rational.The following Theorem 3 pro-
vides epistemic conditions for the notion of rationalizability. This result shows
that rationalizability is the strategic implication of common knowledge of ra-
tionality.
Theorem 3. For any model of knowledge, SCKR  R. Moreover, there is a
model of knowledge such that SCKR = R.
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Proof. Let s 2 SCKR. Then there exists ! 2 CKR such that s (!) = s.
By Lemma 4.3, ! 2 R for some self-evident event R  R. Therefore, for









is rationalizable and hence s 2 S R  R.
Dene 
  R. For any ! = fsigi2N 2 
, for every player i dene
si (!) = si and ti (!) = ti 2 Ti (R) such that si 2 BR (ti). Clearly, every
player i is rational across states in 




and, hence, SCKR = R. 
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have presented a unied framework to analyze rationaliz-
able strategic behavior in any arbitrary game. In particular, we introduce the
model of typeto dene the notion of rationalizability in games with (in)nite
players, arbitrary strategy spaces, and arbitrary payo¤ functions. One impor-
tant feature of this paper is that the framework allows the players to have
various preferences which include subjective expected utility as a special case.
We have investigated properties about rationalizability in general situa-
tions. More specically, we have shown that the union of all the rationalizable
sets is the largest rationalizable set (Lemma 2) and is in the Cartesian-product
form (Lemma 3). Moreover, we have shown that the largest rationalizable set
can be derived by the (possibly transnite) iterated elimination process i.e.,
IENBR (Theorem 1). As a by-product, we have obtained that IENBR is a
well-dened order-independent procedure in general situations (Corollary 1).
In this paper we have investigated the relationship between rationalizabil-
15
ity and Nash equilibrium in general games. While every Nash equilibrium
survives the IENBR procedure, a Nash equilibrium in the nal reduced game
after IENBR may fail to be a Nash equilibrium in the original game. That is,
the IENBR procedure may generate spurious Nash equilibria in innite games.
We have thus provided a su¢ cient and necessary condition to guarantee no
spurious Nash equilibria (Theorem 2). In this paper we have also formulated
and proved that rationalizability is the strategic implication of common knowl-
edge of rationality in general settings (Theorem 3).
To close this paper, we would like to point out some extensions of this
paper for future research. The exploration of the notion of extensive-form
rationalizability in dynamic games remains an interesting subject for further
study. The extension of this paper to games with incomplete information is
clearly an important subject for further research. The extension of this paper
to permit social and coalitional interactions in the notion of rationalizability
is also an intriguing topic worth further investigation; cf. Ambrus (2006) and
Luo and Yang (2009) for the related research on coalitional rationalizability.
16
Bibliography
[1] Ambrus, A., 2006. Coalitional rationalizability. Quart. J. Econ. 121,
903929.
[2] Apt, K.R., 2007. The many faces of rationalizability. The B.E. J. The-
oretical Econ. 7, Art 18.
[3] Aumann, R.J., Brandenburger, A., 1995. Epistemic conditions for Nash
equilibrium. Econometrica 63, 11611180.
[4] Bernheim, B.D., 1984. Rationalizable strategic behavior. Econometrica
52, 10071028.
[5] Chen, Y.C., Long, N.V., Luo, X., 2007. Iterated strict dominance in
general games. Games Econ. Behav. 61, 299-315.
[6] Chen, Y.C., Luo, X., 2010. An indistinguishability result on rationaliz-
ability under general preferences. Mimeo. National University of Singa-
pore.
[7] Epstein, L., 1997. Preference, rationalizability and equilibrium. J. Econ.
Theory 73, 129.
[8] Fagin, R., Geanakoplos, J., Halpern, J.Y., Vardi, M.Y., 1999. The hi-
erarchical approach to modeling knowledge and common knowledge. In-
ternational J. Game Theory 28, 331365.
[9] Harsanyi, J., 1967-68. Games with incomplete information played by
Bayesianplayers, IIII. Manag. Sci. 14, 159-182, 320-334, 486-502.
17
[10] Luo, X., Yang, C.C., 2009. Bayesian coalitional rationalizability. J.
Econ. Theory 144, 248263.
[11] Osborne, M.J., Rubinstein, A., 1994. A Course in Game Theory. MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA.
[12] Pearce, D.G., 1984. Rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem
of perfection. Econometrica 52, 10291051.
[13] Tan, T., Werlang, S., 1988. The Bayesian foundations of solution con-
cepts of games. J. Econ. Theory 45, 370391.
18
